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ARTICLE III JUDGES AND THE INITIATIVE 
PROCESS: ARE ARTICLE III JUDGES 
HOPELESSLY ELITIST? 
Michael Vitiello* and Andrew J. Glendon** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The initiative process, a product of the Progressive and Populist 
reform efforts,1 is so attractive in theory that it seems almost unholy 
to challenge its continuing vitality. Conceived as a way to circumvent 
a legislature under the control of monied interests and the railroads, 
the initiative process demonstrated the Progressive ideology that the 
people needed a vehicle to "directly battle against the corporations' 
organized interests and influential lobbyists. "2 While the theoretical 
underpinnings of the initiative process may be attractive, the reality 
of the initiative process, in its evolvement, is singularly unattractive. 
A motivated group of concerned citizens can no longer rally 
around a cause and secure enough signatures to place it on the bal-
lot.3 The increase in population has led to professionals who collect 
the necessary signatures.4 The cost of qualifying an initiative has 
made the process accessible primarily to monied interests.5 At least 
since Proposition 13,6 powerful political groups have been able to use 
the initiative process to advance a variety of political agenda that 
* Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law; B.A. Swarthmore College, 
1969; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1974. 
** B.S., University of California, Davis, 1995; J.D., McGeorge School of 
Law, 1998. 
1. See discussion infra Part II. 
2. Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desir-
ability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 733, 
736 (1988). 
3. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text. 
6. Proposition 13, in CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION 
58 (June 6, 1978) (enacted as CAL. CONST. art. XIII). 
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often serve corporate and monied interests.7 Advertising campaigns 
are often notoriously misleading, with ads playing on passions of the 
moment and masking serious concerns about the legislation.8 
America has a long history of distrust in mob rule.9 Majority 
rule raises legitimate concerns about insensitivity to the interests of 
those in the minority on any given political issue. Rather than re-
flecting consensus, legislation dictated by the majority is likely to re-
sult in winners and losers without compromise.10 Our constitutional 
scheme reflects our concern about the unbridled majority rule in any 
number of its institutions, including Article III's creation of an inde-
pendent judiciary.11 
Some proponents of direct democracy analogize the initiative 
process to a town meeting in which the majority may accommodate 
minority interests through rational debate.12 This Article examines 
that theory in light of recent experience in California with the initia-
tive process, especially with regard to Proposition 209/ 3 outlawing 
some affirmative action programs. Recent experience with direct 
democracy in California suggests that we use the initiative process in 
ways that exacerbate our differences and ignore legitimate interests 
of significant groups of California citizens. 14 
At the same time that California shifted legislative responsibility 
from the legislature to the electorate through the increased use of the 
initiative process, both the legislature and the courts have come un-
der criticism. For example, initiatives like Proposition 14015-
mandating term limits for state legislators-demonstrate many vot-
ers' hostility towards the legislature.16 Even more troubling is a 
7. See discussion infra Part IV. 
8. See infra notes 53-63, 69-80 and accompanying text. 
9. See discussion infra Part VI. 
10. See infra notes 81-83, 111-17 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text. 
12 See DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECf LEGISLATION 22 (1984); see also infra 
notes 25-35 and accompanying text (expanding on the Progressive reform move-
ment that spawned direct democracy). 
13. Proposition 209, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL 
ELECfiON 30-33 (Nov. 5, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 CALIFORNIA BALLOT 
PAMPHLET] (enacted as CAL. CONST. art. I ,§ 31). 
14. See infra notes 176-81, 210-17 and accompanying text. 
15. Proposition 140, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL 
ELECfiON 68-71 (Nov. 6, 1990) (enacted as CAL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1.5, 2, 4.5; 
art. V, §§ 2, 11; art. VII, § 11; art. IX, § 2; art. XIII, § 17; art. XX,§ 7). 
16. See Sherry B. Jeffe, How Prop. 140 Could Feed the Public's Distrust of 
Government, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, at M5 (stating that "Californians lashed 
out at their state's politicians by passing Proposition 140 last November [of 
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renewed attack on the independent Article III judiciary. Frustrated 
by judges who have impeded immediate implementation of contro-
versial propositions, some, especially conservative, politicians have 
called for restraints on the federal judiciary.17 The most draconian 
demand is the repeal of the lifetime tenure provisions of Article 111.'8 
This Article examines that attack. 
Like so many attacks on the federal judiciary in the past, it is 
driven not by principle, but by current passions over a single decision 
by a federal court.19 One can hope that as passions cool, so too will 
the call for the repeal of a remarkable institution that has served the 
nation well. Article III courts are well equipped to do justice because 
of their independence and because of their capacity for deliberative, 
dispassionate decision-making.20 This Article argues that independ-
ent judges may do a better job than the initiative process in reflecting 
a broad consensus view on controversial social issues.2' 
Specifically, this Article argues that-despite the wide popular 
support for propositions like Proposition 209-recent Supreme Court 
decisions on affirmative action, not readily understood by the elec-
torate, may well come closer to reflecting a consensus than the public 
understands.22 The sad reality is that popular democracy remains the 
victim of the passions of the moment and compares poorly to the re-
flective and incremental process of constitutional adjudication. 
II. THE BIRTH OF CALIFORNIA 'S INITIATIVE PROCESS 
Adopted in 1911, the initiative process was created to limit the 
influence that the Southern Pacific Railroad had over the legislature, 
the judges, and the media.23 The railroad's political domination 
1990]."). 
17. See infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text. 
18. See H .R.J. Res. 77, 105th Cong. (1997) (providing that an Article III 
judge may not hold office for more than 10 years without the consent of the Sen-
ate). 
19. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. 
21. See discussion infra Part VII. 
22 See infra notes 184-217 and accompanying text. 
23. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS IN CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA: A LEGACY LOST? 7 (1984) (hereinafter LEAGUE 
OF WOMEN VOTERS] (noting that between 1895 and 1910 the California Supreme 
Court decided 57 of 79 cases in favor of Southern Pacific); Judy B. Rosener, Take 
the Initiative to Reform the Process, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at 04. 
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allowed the railroad enormous control over local and state govern-
ment, giving the railroad an unfair competitive advantage over rivals 
and the general citizenry.24 
The Progressive movement proposed the initiative process as a 
means to overcome corporate control of the legislature "by allowing 
the people to directly battle against the corporations' organized in-
terests and influential lobbyists. "25 The initiative process reflected a 
tenant of the Progressive's ideology: that the citizens can govern 
themselves.u Only by restoring power to the general citizenry could 
democracy be restored and corruption caused by big business and the 
political machine be purged from the system.27 
Progressives assumed that citizens were educated and in-
formed.28 Unlike the legislature, where deals were consummated in 
private smoke-filled rooms, the initiative process would allow all 
voices to be heard. In the words of one prominent reform scholar, 
the initiative process was "merely an attempt to get back to the basic 
idea of the old town meeting. "29 
24. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 23, at 6. Los Angeles was 
forced to pay Southern Pacific $600,000, to give them a franchise intended for a 
competing railroad, and to provide a site for the depot in order to keep the rail-
road from going around the city. See id. Five ranchers died in 1877 while trying 
to protect their land from the ever-expanding lines of the railroad. See id. at 7. 
25. Fountaine, supra note 2, at 736. 
26. See MAGLEBY, supra note 12, at 21. The Progressive movement assumed 
an educated and informed citizenry, and believed that direct democracy is pref-
erable to a politician- or legislature-based government. See id. at 21-22. The 
Progressive's legislative distrust is evidenced by their writings: 
If the Initiative and Referendum are given to the people of this 
state [California], the fraudulent claims bills that slide through our 
legislature will be vetoed by the people, and legislative extravagance 
will be checked. 
The citizens of every state have seen legislature after legislature 
enact laws for the special advantage of a few and refuse to enact laws 
for the welfare of the many. 
The constant, unremitting application of corrupt influence to 
control the action of legislative bodies comes to be expected, almost 
tolerated .... That politics should be a school of corruption is enough 
to make the angels weep. What can be more deadly to democracy 
than this? What plague can equal this plague of political leprosy? 
/d. (internal citations omitted). 
27. See id. at 21 (quoting a Progressive scholar who wrote, "if big business 
was the ultimate enemy of the Progressive, his proximate enemy was the political 
machine"). 
28. See id. at 22. 
29. !d. 
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"Kick the Southern Pacific out of politics!" cried Hiram John-
son, then a candidate for the Republican nomination in the 1910 Cali-
fornia gubernatorial election.30 The Progressive-influenced Lincoln-
Roosevelt League asked Johnson to enter the race in California's 
first direct primary election.31 Johnson made the challenge to the 
railroad's power his central campaign issue.32 After winning a five-
way race for the nomination, he defeated another Progressive-
minded candidate, Democrat Theodore Bell, in the general election.33 
Once elected, Johnson implemented his campaign promises. In 
1911 the legislature passed twenty-three constitutional amendments, 
including the initiative and referendum programs.34 Those measures 
won voter approval by a three-to-one margin.35 Thus, began the era 
of direct democracy aimed at taking the lawmaking power out of the 
hands of wealthy special interests and placing it in the hands of the 
general citizenry. 
30. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 23, at 9. 
31. See id. at 8. Two newspapermen, Chester Rowell of the Fresno Republi-
can and Edward Dickerson of the Los Angeles Express, are credited with organ-
izing the successful movement which finally freed the Republican party and then 
the State of California, from the power of the Southern Pacific Railroad. See id. 
This reform-minded Republican organization changed the political composition 
of the state and was responsible for " the most significant social, economic, and 
political revolution in its history." !d. at 8-9. See also Reform the Reforms, S.F. 
EXAM., Oct. 28, 1996, at A16 (noting that Hiram Johnson was elected Califor-
nia's governor in 1911 with the help of the Good Government Group, a reform 
movement of breakaway Republicans known as the "Goo Goos"). 
32 See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 23, at 9. 
33. See id. The votes received by each candidate totaled as follows: Johnson 
with 177,191; Bell with 154,835; and the Socialist candidate receiving 47,819. See 
id. at 10. 
34. See id. (noting that only one proposal, concerning railroad passes for 
public officials, failed to win approval); see also Reform the Reforms, supra note 
31, at A16 (listing some of the political changes established by Johnson, the most 
noteworthy being: the vote for women, worker's compensation, and minimum 
wage hours for women and children). Hiram Johnson may not have known what 
direct legislation was immediately prior to winning the gubernatorial election. 
Rather, some believe that the idea of the initiative process may have been given 
to him by a "friend" so that "the old political machine wouldn't have the power 
over the people it once had" in the event Johnson lost the next election. !d. 
35. See Sam Stanton, Taking the Initiative: California Voters Lay Down the 
Law at the Ballot Box-Routinely, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 4, 1996, at A1 
(finding that 168,744 voters approved the initiative process in the 1911 special 
election, whereas only 52,093 voted against it). 
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III. SOME OF THE REALITIES OF THE INITIATIVE PROCESS 
California uses the initiative process more than any other state 
or country in the world.36 But the early promise of its founders has 
not been realized. Its failure is a result of several factors, some relat-
ing to the mechanics of qualifying an initiative and some to modern 
political campaigns generally. 
The first step to qualify an initiative for the ballot is not onerous. 
It requires submission of the proposed measure to the Attorney 
General with a nominal fee. 37 The proponents must include a written 
request that a title and a summary of the proposed measure be pre-
pared.38 The Attorney General must submit the summary to the Sec-
retary of State within fifteen days after receipt of the proposed ini-
tiative.39 The Attorney General must also deliver the summary to the 
proponents of the measure, who have 150 days to collect the required 
number of signatures from the electorate.40 
If the initiative is a statute, proponents must collect five percent 
of the number of voters in the previous gubernatorial election.41 
Eight percent is required for a constitutional amendment.42 The sig-
nature requirement is intended to keep frivolous or unreasonably 
narrow initiatives off the ballot.43 The signatures are gathered on 
36. See Pamela J. Podger, The Big Ballot, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 6, 19%, at A1; 
Stanton, supra note 35, at Al. Roughly 800 initiatives have been proposed over 
the years in California, with 238 making the ballot. See id. The most common 
result of these initiatives is voter disapproval. Only 77 of the 238 initiatives, a 
mere 32.4%, were approved by the voters. See id. 
37. See CAL. ELEC. CODE§ 9002 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998). Each proponent 
must submit a written statement, signed under penalty of perjury, which states 
that no part of the measure was included in exchange for a contribution for pur-
poses of qualifying the measure for ballot. See id. (Supp. 1998). The $200 sub-
mission fee is to be held in trust and returned to the proponents if the measure 
qualifies for ballot, or paid to the State's General Fund if the measure does not 
qualify for ballot. See id. § 9004. 
38. See id. § 9002 (Supp. 1998). 
39. See id. § 9004. During this 15-day period, the proponents may make 
amendments to the proposed initiative measure. See id. If the Attorney General 
is a proponent of the measure, then the summary shall be prepared by the Legis-
lative Counsel. See id. § 9003. 
40. See id. § 336. 
41. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8; Stanton, supra note 35, at A1 (stating that to 
place an initiative statute on the November 1996 Ballot required about 433,000 
signatures). 
42 See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8; Dan Bernstein, Lottery Initiative Was One 
Consultant's Roll of the Dice, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 5, 1996, at A1 (finding 
that for a constitutional amendment to have reached the ballot by initiative, in 
the November 1996 election, required 693,000 signatures). 
43. See MAGLEBY, supra note 12, at 41. 
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petitions which may be circulated by any qualified voter and are cir-
culated on a county-by-county basis.44 Signatures must be verified. 45 
After verification the Secretary of State must place the measure on 
the ballot, if it qualifies at least 131 days before the next general 
election.46 
In 1912-in the first election after the initiative process was 
adopted-proponents needed to collect only 53,484 signatures to 
qualify a measure for the ballot.47 A group of concerned citizens 
could gather enough signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot 
in the allotted time period. Many early measures demonstrated that 
kind of citizen activism.48 
By 1996, because of the increase in population and in the num-
ber of qualified voters, proponents had to collect at least 433,000 sig-
natures to qualify a measure for the ballot.49 It is no longer possible 
for a few dedicated people to collect the necessary signatures. 
Enter the signature gatherers. As one journalist has commented, 
"[e]ven before World War II, a shrewd Californian named Joe Rob-
inson spotted a flaw in old Hiram's reform, and invented a new po-
litical profession."50 The new profession is that of the signature solici-
tor. A signature solicitor is paid a specified sum per signature. For 
example, in Robinson's day, a solicitor might receive a nickel per sig-
nature.51 Modern day solicitors command much greater fees.52 
44. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9021. 
45. See id. § 9030(d); see generally CAL. CONST. art. II,§ 8; CAL. ELEC. CODE 
§§ 9030-9031 (detailing the signature verification process). 
46. See CAL. CONST. art. II,§ 8(c). 
47. See Stanton, supra note 35, at Al. 
48. See Rebecca Boyd, 84 Years of Initiatives in California, SACRAMENTO 
BEE, Aug. 4, 1996, at All (listing the initiatives qualifying for ballot over the 84-
year history of the initiative process). In 1912 three initiative measures qualified 
for the ballot. See id. Proposition 7, the only initiative statute, proposed the 
creation of a horse racing commission prohibiting bookmaking. See id. Proposi-
tions 6 and 8 were constitutional amendments dealing with local governments. 
See id. The former authorized the merger of city and county governments, and 
the latter allowed local governments to raise funds by establishing a "single tax" 
system. See id. It seems that the 1912 election reflected the purpose of the ini-
tiative process: to allow a group of citizen activists to propose needed legislation, 
because the single tax system of Proposition 8 appeared in the five subsequent 
elections, all by initiative. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 23, at 23 
(noting that this recurrent idea of the people was defeated each time). 
49. See Stanton, supra note 35, at Al. 
50. Gene Marine, Take the Initiative-Please, S.F. EXAM., Oct. 24, 1996, at 
A19. 
51. See id. 
52 See Stanton, supra note 35, at Al. For some issues holding widespread 
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The cost of gathering signatures is hardly the only cost. How-
ever, it is a significant deterrent to individuals or groups with limited 
resources. While the cost may be prohibitive to the general citizenry, 
the cost is not significant to well-financed special interest groups. 
Advertising has become critical to the initiative process. Even 
more daunting than the cost of gathering signatures is the cost of an 
effective media campaign in support of or in opposition to a proposed 
initiative. For example, in 1994 tobacco lobbyists spent an estimated 
$18 million in an effort to pass Proposition 188,53 a measure designed 
to weaken local anti-smoking ordinances.54 One tobacco company 
alone spent $2 million just to qualify the proposition for the ballot.55 
Proponents of Proposition 21156 collected millions of dollars from law 
firms in support of a measure that would have made it easier to file a 
securities fraud lawsuit in California.57 Its opponents, Silicon Valley 
corporations and Wall Street securities dealers, raised over $10 mil-
lion "to keep those commercials about the lawyers in [their] limou-
sines coming into California's living rooms."58 In fact its opponents 
raised so much money that they had excess millions to campaign 
against Proposition 217,59 which would have restored the top income 
tax bracket.60 Proposition 209, the anti-affirmative action initiative, 
made it on the ballot only because its proponents received more than 
$3 million from the Republican National Committee and the Cali-
fornia Republican Party.61 
public interest, such as recidivist offender statutes and illegal aliens, petition 
companies do not have to pay as much per signature. However, "[o]n other is-
sues like the open primary initiative that passed in March [of 1996], I think a lot 
of people weren't sure what it was and what it meant and its impact," thus requir-
ing that signature solicitors be paid a lot more money. /d. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. 
55. See Big Bucks Used to Qualify Initiatives, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 31, 1994, at 
A4. 
56. Proposition 211, in 1996 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 13, 
at 38-41. 
57. See Peter Schrag, No, No, a Dozen Times No, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 
11, 1996, at B6. 
58. /d. 
59. Proposition 217, in 1996 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 13, 
at 68-71. 
60. See Peter Schrag, Mammon Works the Voters, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 
13, 1996, at B6. 
61. See Jerome Karabel, Why Prop. 209 Won't Spread to Other States, S.F. 
EXAM., Nov. 25, 1996, at A17. Paid professionals, not volunteers, gathered more 
than 85% of the signatures required to qualify "this self-proclaimed Populist 
measure" for ballot. /d. 
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No one should be surprised that money talks in politics, whether 
in the legislative or initiative process. As developed in the following 
discussion, the initiative process is at risk of becoming the captive of 
special interest groups.62 Through misleading advertising, not just 
well-financed campaigns, those groups have been able to skew elec-
tion results. 63 
IV. THE MODERN ERA OF THE INITIATIVE PROCESS 
Many commentators identify Proposition 13 as the turning point 
for the initiative process.64 Prior to 1978 the process was used infre-
quently.65 Prior to Proposition 13, for example, only 153 initiatives 
appeared on the ballot. Since then, the increase has been dramatic.66 
Proposition 13 enacted strict limitations on future property-tax 
bills, giving property holders large tax breaks at the expense of newer 
arrivals.67 The initiative forced major changes in the way state serv-
ices are funded.68 It represented far more than a tax revolt. 
Howard Jarvis was the chief proponent of Proposition 13.69 
Jarvis portrayed himself as an angry taxpayer leading a revolt against 
the California property-tax system.70 Aiming much of the advertising 
campaign towards senior citizens who had seen their property taxes 
skyrocket as the value of their homes escalated, Jarvis was able tore-
cruit numerous volunteers into his Jarvis and Gann Tax Reform As-
sociation. However, the greatest beneficiaries of tax reform were not 
62 See infra text accompanying notes 69-83. 
63. See discussion infra Part IV. 
64. See Stanton, supra note 35, at A1 (finding that Proposition 13 passed in 
1978 by a 65% to 35% margin). 
65. See id. (noting that prior to 1978, the year that Proposition 13 passed, only 
153 initiatives made the ballot in the initiative's 66-year history). 
66. See id. Over an 18-year period, from 1978 to 1996, 84 initiatives have 
been placed on the ballot with no end in sight. See id. Since 1978 the average 
rate of initiatives has doubled from 2.3 per year to 4.6 per year. 
67. Proposition 13 restricts the maximum property tax rate to 1% and limits 
increases in assessed valuation to 2% per year. See Jonathan M. Coupal, 
Proposition 13 Has Made Everyone's Tax Reasonable, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 
1989, at M7. This taxation system favors long-term property owners because the 
system uses the acquisition value of property as the basis of taxation. When 
property is sold, the value is reassessed at fair market value. See id. "Thus, re-
cent purchasers derive no immediate benefit from the limitation on annual in-
creases in taxable value." ld. Because Proposition 13 uses the purchase price as 
a basis for taxation, it is possible for similarly situated neighbors to have signifi-
cantly different tax bills. See id. 
68. See Stanton, supra note 35, at Al. 
69. See Marine, supra note 50, at A19. 
70. See id. 
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home owners; they were "really large landowners,-corporate farm-
ers, utilities, [and] oil companies-[ who] poured their money into 
[Jarvis's] campaign."71 As one commentator has observed, "[t]o this 
day, there are Californians who still think that Howard Jarvis was just 
an angry old man, and that Proposition 13 was some sort of genuine 
'grass-roots revolt' in the Hiram Johnson tradition."72 Proposition 13 
demonstrated the ability of special interest groups to raise large sums 
of money, using powerful Populist themes, while the true beneficiar-
ies and the actual impact of the initiative remained undisclosed. 
Special interest groups, able to raise the money necessary to pay for 
signature gatherers and to fund successful and often misleading ad-
vertising campaigns, have recognized the initiative process as a bo-
nanza.73 
Proposition 13 was hardly unique both in the large amount of 
money that was raised by special interest groups and in the mislead-
ing campaigns that followed. One co-author of this Article has writ-
ten extensively about the misleading campaign that led to passage of 
Proposition 184,74 the "three strikes" initiative.75 For example, the 
campaign literature relied on a methodologically flawed study pre-
pared by Governor Pete Wilson's Chief Economist.76 The study pro-
jected that "three strikes" would save billions of dollars, a claim that 
Governor Wilson, in the midst of a close gubernatorial election, re-
peated often.n Even more misleading were claims that the law tar-
geted rapists, child molesters, and murderers.78 Not revealed was the 
fact that "three strikes" predictably would lead to long prison sen-
tences for aging felons convicted of non-violent "third strike" 
71. ld. 
72 ld. 
73. See J. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. 
L. REv. 327, 338-39 (1992). 
74. Proposition 184, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL 
ELECTION 32-37 (Nov. 8, 1994) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1170.12 (West 
Supp. 1997)). 
75. See generally Michael Vitiello, "Three Strikes" and the Romero Case: The 
Supreme Court Restores Democracy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1643 (1997) 
[hereinafter Romero]; Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Ra-
tionality?, 87 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 395 (1997) [hereinafter Return to 
Rationality]. 
76. See Romero, supra note 75, at 1674-76, 1679-85 (discussing the methodo-
logical flaws in the report by PHILIP J. ROMERO, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF 
PLANNING AND REsEARCH, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, HOW lNCARCERA TING 
MORE FELONS WILL BENEFIT CALIFORNIA'S ECONOMY (1994)). 
77. See id. at 1674-76. 
78. See Return to Rationality, supra note 75, at 451-52 & n.327. 
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felonies.79 Contrary evidence simply did not get out to the public. In 
many cases, as was the case with Proposition 184, there is little organ-
ized opposition to the proposition and any opposition that exists is 
often poorly funded.80 
Special interest groups have found the initiative process attrac-
tive because, among other things, those groups can raise the money 
necessary to fund a campaign. No doubt, if one judges by the kinds 
of advertising campaigns relied on, those groups know that adoption 
of powerful slogans can substitute for hard policy analysis. However, 
using the initiative process means that the winner takes all.81 
The more extreme the special interest group, the less likely that 
the group wants to risk the give-and-take compromises that may be 
necessary to pass legislation. Proponents of a given legislative agen-
dum are often frustrated with the legislative process because it tends 
to force compromise. In the legislature a bill may be subject to horse 
trading by various interest groups.82 While dissenters may not be able 
to block legislation, they may be able to force accommodation in ex-
change for support. 83 
The initiative process poses unique advantages over the legisla-
tive process. Especially if armed with funds for a powerful media 
campaign, proponents of a given measure do not have to compro-
mise. They may be able to simplify the issues, mislead the voters, and 
win without compromise. 
V. THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 
In theory, the initiative process is supposed to reflect the will of 
the people. Despite the misleading campaigns, proponents of the 
various ballot initiatives make extravagant claims once the measures 
have passed. For example, Governor Pete Wilson and Attorney 
General Dan Lungren were extremely critical of the California Su-
preme Court when it interpreted the "three strikes" law in a manner 
79. See id. at 437-41. 
80. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215: De Facto Legalization of Pot 
and the Shortcomings of Direct Democracy , 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forth-
coming Spring 1998) [hereinafter De Facto Legalization] (observing that oppo-
nents of Proposition 215 were not well organized and spent little to defeat the 
initiative). 
81. See Kelso, supra note 73, at 336 n.44, 338-40. 
82 See id. at 339. 
83. See id. 
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that avoided conflict with the state constitution's separation of pow-
ers provision.84 Both have spoken with almost religious fervor about 
the court's frustration of the will of the people.85 But an objective ex-
amination of many of the recent initiative battles suggests that voters 
have been misled. Even the most devoted advocates of direct de-
mocracy must feel some hesitation in making unequivocal statements 
about just what the "people" have approved on a given occasion.86 
Proposition 21587 provides a case study on point. A significant 
majority of Californians favor use of marijuana for medical purposes 
for certain illnesses.88 The California legislature passed two bills that 
would have authorized its use under certain circumstances;89 twice, 
Pete Wilson vetoed that legislation.90 In part out of desperation with 
the legislative process, Dennis Peron, long-time marijuana legaliza-
tion activist, led the efforts to place Proposition 215, authorizing the 
use of marijuana for medicinal purposes, on the 1996 ballot.91 
84. See generally Maura Dolan & Tony Perry, Justices Deal Blow to '3 
Strikes': Lower Courts Allowed Discretion in Sentencing, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 
1996, at A1 (noting that state Republican leaders condemned the Romero ruling 
by the California Supreme Court); James F. Sweeney, Foul Ball, NAT'L REv., 
Aug. 12, 1996, at 1 (stating that Governor Pete Wilson and Attorney General 
Dan Lungren immediately joined a coalition to draft and introduce a legislative 
response to the Romero decision). 
85. Perhaps not surprisingly, neither has shown similar zeal with regard to 
implementation of Proposition 215, which both opposed. 
86. That may explain why, although the California Supreme Court has sug-
gested that the courts must liberally construe an initiative "to promote the demo-
cratic process," the court's process of interpretation shows far more restraint. 
Kelso, supra note 73, at 347 (quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 219, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283, 149 Cal. 
Rptr. 239, 241 (1978)). 
87. Proposition 215, in 1996 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 13, 
at 58-61 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 
1997)). Proposition 215 creates an immunity from prosecution for possession of 
marijuana for certain qualifying patients and their caregivers. 
88. See Tracie Cone, Reefer Madness , SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 14, 
1995, at 12, 14 (stating that 66% of those surveyed statewide supported a law al-
lowing medicinal use of marijuana with a doctor's prescription). 
89. See A.B. 1529, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995); S.B. 1364, 1993-94 Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 1994). 
90. See Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to the California 
Assembly (Oct. 15, 1995) reprinted in 1995-1996 ASSEMBLY JOURNAL 4135, 4157 
(1995) (vetoing A.B. 1529); Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to 
the California Senate (Sept. 30, 1994) reprinted in 1993-1994 SENATE JOURNAL 
7055, 7097 (1994) (vetoing S.B. 1364). 
91. See Greg Lucas, Bill Flow Slows as Senate, Assembly Fight over Funds, 
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13, 1995, at A16; Dennis Peron, Yes on Prop. 215: A Mission 
of Mercy, S.F. EXAM., Oct. 20, 1996, at C15. 
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The proposition's language was intentionally ambiguous.92 At 
the same time, the campaign in support of its passage focused on se-
riously ill people, including AIDS and cancer patients and their fami-
lies.93 The campaign focused on "compassionate use" of marijuana;94 
the ballot literature stated that the initiative would allow "seriously 
and terminally ill patients to legally use marijuana, if, and only if, 
they have the approval of a licensed physician. "95 Careful examina-
tion of the language of the initiative-the kind of examination in 
which typical voters are not likely to engage-would have demon-
strated the threat that the initiative might lead to de facto legalization 
of marijuana for many Californians.96 It would also have demon-
strated that the limitations suggested in the campaign were not re-
flected in the statutory language of the proposition.97 
One of the first appellate decisions interpreting Proposition 215 
demonstrates some of the difficulties in divining the will of the peo-
ple as reflected in the initiative process.98 Proposition 215 grants a 
defense in a prosecution for certain marijuana offenses to a qualify-
ing patient who possesses marijuana with the recommendation of a 
physician.99 The defense extends to that patient's caregiver.100 The 
proposition was silent on how caregivers and qualifying patients were 
to secure marijuana.101 Some of the campaign literature suggested 
that the initiative allowed individuals to cultivate their own mari-
juana.102 The most highly publicized sources of marijuana have been 
92 See Interview with Dennis Peron, President of Californians for Compas-
sionate Use, in San Francisco, Cal. (March 5, 1997) (transcript on file with 
McGeorge School of Law). 
93. See Proposition 215, in 1996 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 
13, at 60. 
94. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(a) (West Supp. 1997) 
(explaining that this section, formerly Proposition 215, shall be known and cited 
as "The Compassionate Use Act of 1996"); CALIFORNIANS FOR COMPASSIONATE 
USE, BROCHURE (1996). 
95. Proposition 215, in 1996 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 13, 
at 60. 
96. See De Facto Legalization, supra note 80, at 14-44 & nn.76-255. 
97. See id. 
98. See Lungren v. Peron, 59 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 1397-98,70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 
30 (1997). 
99. See id. at 1387, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 23. 
100. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 11362.5(d) (West Supp. 1997). 
101. See De Facto Legalization, supra note 80, at 32-33. 
102 See Proposition 215, in 19% CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 
13, at 60. 
1288 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1275 
cannabis-buyers clubs that existed prior to the passage of the initia-
tive and that have proliferated since that time.103 
The issue before the First District Court of Appeal was whether 
a cannabis club can qualify as a "caregiver" within the meaning of the 
statute.104 Given the statutory definition, the court's conclusion that a 
club does not qualify as a caregiver is hardly surprising.105 However, 
the court of appeal had to ignore the context in which the initiative 
passed. Shortly before the election, Attorney General Lungren 
raided the Cannabis Buyers Club and busted Dennis Peron.106 If only 
for that reason, many voters must have known that Proposition 215 
was a referendum on Peron's club.107 In addition, the court's decision 
leaves many qualifying patients without a legal source of marijuana.108 
Similar problems of construction arise frequently when voters 
approve initiatives because the propositions are often drafted by lay-
people who are not skilled in legislative drafting109 or by those who 
intend to create ambiguity with the hope that courts will give broad 
meaning to the legislation.110 
Other problems exist in determining the will of the people. In 
many elections voter turn out is low, and as a result the "will of the 
people," reflected in the passage of a given initiative, may in fact re-
flect the view of a minority of eligible voters.111 
Even when substantial numbers of people vote in favor of an 
initiative and even if people have not been misled by extravagant ad-
vertising campaigns or by ambiguous language, the initiative process 
does not allow for modification or compromise.112 Prior to the 1992 
election, a majority of Californians stated that they favored physi-
cian-assisted suicide.113 Nonetheless, Proposition 161114 failed to 
103. See De Facto Legalization, supra note 80, at 13 (discussing how Attorney 
General Lungren's raid on Peron's club may have affected the vote in favor of 
Proposition 215). 
104. See Lungren, 59 Cal. App. 4th at 1387, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23. 
105. See De Facto Legalization, supra note 80, at 19-20 (arguing that cannabis 
clubs do not come within the statutory definition of "primary caregivers"). 
106. See id. at 13. 
107. See id. 
108. See Lungren, 59 Cal. App. 4th at 1401-02, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32 (Kline, J., 
concurring). 
109. See Kelso, supra note 73, at 339-40. 
110. See id. at 344-45. 
111. See, e.g., Otto Friedrich, To Reform the System, TIME, Feb. 23, 1981, at 36 
(citing turnout for then-recent election at 53% of the voters). 
112 See De Facto Legalization, supra note 80, at 8-9. 
113. See Eric Bailey, Action on "Right to Die" Languishes in California, L.A. 
TIMES, June 27, 1997, at A12 (noting that some pre-election polls showed 75% 
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secure a majority required for passage.115 Its failure to pass may have 
resulted from concerns about the lack of safeguards built into the 
legislation. Hence, failure to pass the proposition did not mean that 
Californians disapproved of physician-assisted suicide. Divining the 
will of the people in such cases is difficult at best. 
Many of us who voted for Proposition 215 did so with trepida-
tion. We approved of the limited use of marijuana for medical pur-
poses and were frustrated with the intransigence of Governor Wilson 
and the federal government in blocking compassionate use of mari-
juana for seriously ill patients, but we did not want our votes to be 
construed as approval of de facto legalization of pot or as approval of 
the use of marijuana for people suffering from migraine headaches. 116 
However, voters were not given a choice. The initiative process has 
virtually no flexibility, unlike the legislative process where propo-
nents of a bill may face numerous changes that bring the legislation 
closer to a true consensus of public sentiment.117 
While the initiative process was supposed to guarantee direct 
democracy, leading to passage of legislation reflecting the will of the 
people, a dispassionate look at the process in recent years suggests 
that the initiative process is at best only a partial reflection of major-
ity sentiment. Low voter turnout skews results. Confusing or inten-
tionally ambiguous legislation passed by a misled public can hardly 
be a clear reflection of popular will. The initiative process is more 
likely than the legislative process to force voters to make choices be-
tween two positions, neither of which reflects the broadest view of 
the public. Absent compromise, the process increases the chances 
that an extremist position will prevail over a position favored by a 
broader majority of the population. 
approval of the physician-assisted suicide measure on the 1992 ballot). 
114. Proposition 161, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL 
ELECfiON 32-35 (Nov. 3, 1992). 
115. See Dianne Gassman, 161's Lack of Safeguards, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 7, 
1992, at B7. 
116. We base these observations on our own informal survey of colleagues 
with whom we have discussed Proposition 215, as well as our views on the sub-
ject. One author of this Article has conducted a non-scientific sampling of 
friends who voted in favor of the proposition. Most had, at best, an incomplete 
understanding of what the initiative accomplished. 
117. See De Facto Legalization, supra note 80, at 8-9. 
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VI. THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OR MOB RULE 
The Framers of the Constitution distrusted direct democracy. 118 
That distrust is reflected in numerous institutions created by the Con-
stitution, including the bi-camerallegislature,119 veto power by the ex-
ecutive,120 the legislature's power to overrule the president's veto only 
upon a super-majority,121 and the power to amend the Constitution, 
again only through a super-majority.122 Indeed, in some sense, consti-
tutional government where the Constitution limits legislative action 
will often be undemocratic. As suggested by James Madison in The 
Federalist Paper Number Ten, 123 a republican form of government is 
more likely than direct democracy to produce sound policy.124 
Article III's creation of an independent judiciary is another im-
portant instance in which the Constitution distanced federal authority 
from mob rule. Article III does not mandate the creation of federal 
courts other than the Supreme Court, but it does require that judges 
have certain protection: "The Judges, both of the supreme and infe-
rior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, 
at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which 
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. " 125 That 
those provisions were to guarantee judicial independence is uncon-
troverted and produced no significant disagreement among the 
Framers.126 
Judicial independence is not intended only as a protection for 
the individual judge. Instead it is intended to assure the quality of 
the court's decision-making consistent with requirements of justice 
and free from the concern about pleasing the political branches of 
government.121 While commentators continue to debate whether 
there is parity between federal and state court judges in their ability 
118. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (explaining that the 
republican form of government avoids the evils of factions and the tyranny of the 
majority). 
119. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
120. See id. § 7, cl. 2. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. § 7, cl. 3. 
123. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
124. See id. 
125. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1. 
126. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICfiON: TENSIONS IN THE 
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 8 (2d ed. 1990). 
127. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also REDISH, su-
pra note 126, at 50-52 (discussing policy favoring Article III over legislative 
courts). 
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to protect federal rights holders,128 those who argue that federal 
judges are superior to state court judges point to judicial independ-
ence as a primary explanation for why federal judges are better than 
state court judges.129 As summarized by Professor Erwin Chemerin-
sky, "the federal judicial system has greater insulation from political 
pressure because federal judges have life tenure and salaries that 
cannot be decreased, whereas [most states have] some form of judi-
cial election. "130 
That the Framers intended to insulate judges from political pres-
sure has not saved federal judges from attack when they have used 
their independence to protect minority rights. From the inception of 
the United States, losing litigants and their supporters have excori-
ated decisions by federal courts when those courts have frustrated 
their goals.131 At least since the liberal reforms effectuated by the 
Warren Court, predominately conservative critics have attacked fed-
eral courts, especially the Supreme Court, as undemocratic. 
For example, part of former Judge Bork's criticism of the judici-
ary in The Tempting of America132 was that Article III judges, under 
the sway of the liberal elite, were out of touch with majority senti-
ment.133 For example, according to Bork, "Legislation is far more 
likely to reflect majority sentiment while judicial activism is likely to 
represent an elite minority's sentiment. "134 That elite is dominated by 
theorists who, Bork accuses, "wind up ... prescribing a new constitu-
tional law that is much more egalitarian and socially permissive than 
either the actual Constitution or the legislative opinion of the Ameri-
can public. "135 Activist judges confronted by the anger of the people, 
.deflect the anger "by claiming merely to have been enforcing the 
128. Compare Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 
(1977), and Julie A. Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention: Clarifying the 
Roles of State and Federal Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 
1 (1986), with Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation 
in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983). 
129. See, e.g., Neubome, supra note 128, at 1110-15. 
130. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 34 (2d ed. 1994). 
131. See, e.g., 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES 
HISTORY 514-25 (1926) (discussing negative reactions to the Supreme Court's 
decision in McCulloch v. Maryland). 
132. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). 
133. See id. at 16-17. 
134. /d. at 17. 
135. /d. at 6. 
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Constitution. "136 In Bork's view, that "Constitution" is one that activ-
ist judges of all stripes have made up.137 
At times the attack has come from within the Court. For exam-
ple, Justice Scalia has argued that the Court must rely on the original 
understanding of the Constitution in order to prevent judges from 
imposing their own values in place of the will of the political branches 
of government.138 Recently, for example, in his dissent in Romer v. 
Evans, 139 Justice Scalia accused the Court of imposing its will in place 
of that of the voters of Colorado with regard to "traditional sexual 
mores. "
140 In arguing an extremely narrow view of the Constitution, 
Justice Scalia argued that absent a specific constitutional protection 
relating to homosexuality, the subject "is left to be resolved by nor-
mal democratic means. "141 The Romer majority, according to Justice 
Scalia, imposed "upon all Americans" the values of "the elite class 
from which the Members of this institution are selected .... "142 
Like Judge Bork, Justice Scalia appears to see America engaged 
in a cultural war in which the Supreme Court is at odds with the ma-
jority of Americans. The will of the people in Romer was reflected in 
a ballot initiative amending its state's constitution.143 
Court critics profess faith that the democratic process reflects 
the will of the people and that federal courts are hopelessly out of 
touch with majoritarian sentiment.144 One might dismiss the attack on 
the Court as the frustration of the losing party in any given dispute. 
In the past, attacks on the Court have subsided over time. For ex-
ample, southern and western states openly defied the federal gov-
ernment because of those states' hostility to the national bank.145 
Ohio not only imposed a tax on the bank, but then, in defiance of a 
federal court order, entered the bank and carried off approximately 
136. /d. at 17. 
137. See id. at 15 passim. 
138. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 
854 (1989). 
139. 517 u.s. 620 (1996). 
140. /d. at 636 (Scalia, J. , dissenting). 
141. /d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
142 /d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
143. See id. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
144. See id. at 645-46 (Scalia, J. , dissenting). For example, then Justice 
Rehnquist commented that "[b)ecause the Supreme Court is so 'thoroughly un-
democratic' . . . he believes its role should be circumscribed." John A. Jenkins, 
The Partisan: A Talk with Justice Rehnquist, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 3, 1985, at 
28, 34 (emphasis in original). 
145. See WARREN, supra note 131, at 525-40 (describing southern and western 
states' reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland). 
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$120,000.146 By the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision, the 
economic conditions that gave rise to the hostility towards the bank 
had improved. The Supreme Court's decision, reaffirming the right 
of the bank to exist and affirming the power of the federal court to 
issue the injunction against the state officials was announced without 
public reaction. 147 
Recent attacks by conservatives arguing that the federal courts 
are undemocratic is not without some irony. When popular legisla-
tion has frustrated their political agenda, they have been quick to use 
the federal courts and to raise federal constitutional challenges to 
overturn the will of the people. Challenges to gun control measures 
provide one example. 148 Challenges under the Takings Clause/49 
when, for example, popular environmental legislation diminishes an 
owner's property value, provide another example where conserva-
tives ought to appreciate the value of access to an independent fed-
eral court and the value of constitutional rights that are inconsistent 
with majority sentiment.150 
One might be inclined to dismiss conservative criticism of fed-
eral courts simply as distaste for particular results rendered by those 
courts. However, the anger towards federal courts seems to run 
deeper. Although conservatives have scored major victories in those 
courts, much of the public still seems to view federal courts with 
hostility. 151 
At various points in our history, critics of federal courts have 
proposed legislation aimed at undercutting the authority of those 
courts. President Roosevelt's court-packing scheme is a notable ex-
ample of an attack by liberals. 152 More frequent have been bills that 
146. See id. at 529. 
147. See id. at 538. 
148. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). 
149. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
150. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) 
(upholding the right of a property owner to economic compensation when state 
environmental legislation prevents him from using his property as he desired). 
151. See Another Bites the Dust: A Federal Judge Voids California Term Lim-
its, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 26, 1997, at B8 (arguing that California voters 
have a "jaundiced" view of the initiative process due to the regularity with which 
federal judges stay or strike down popularly approved initiatives); John Marelius, 
Keep Proposition Process as Is, Voters Say: Poll Reveals Attitude Toward Initia-
tives, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 3, 1997, at A3 (finding that the greatest 
negative response to the initiative process is that "so many ballot measures are 
not enforced or are overturned in court"). 
152 See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 147-48 (3d ed. 1986). 
President Roosevelt's proposal was entitled "Reorganization of the Federal Ju-
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would have deprived federal courts of jurisdiction over specific cate-
gories of cases. During the 1950s, bills were introduced that would 
have limited federal courts' jurisdiction over cases involving loyalty 
oaths, state bar admissions requirements, and other cases involving 
state subversive activities legislation.153 Members of Congress sought 
to reverse statutorily decisions by the Warren Court, including cases 
like Baker v. Carr, 1S4 requiring legislative reapportionment, and the 
desegregation cases. ISS The strategy escalated during the early Rea-
gan years. In 1981 and 1982 alone, thirty such bills were introduced 
in Congress that would have curtailed federal court jurisdiction over 
cases involving issues such as school prayer, abortion, and school 
busing.156 In part because of serious questions about the constitu-
tionality of those various bills, 151 Congress fortunately did not enact 
measures that would have undercut constitutional rights.15R 
The failure of earlier legislation should not result in compla-
cency. Most recently, proponents of various initiatives, primarily en-
acting conservative legislation, have been frustrated by the ability of 
federal courts to slow the implementation of the initiatives or to 
overturn them entirely.159 A movement is afoot to rewrite Article III, 
abandoning life tenure for judges.160 The message would be clear for 
federal judges; judicial independence would be sacrificed in the name 
of direct democracy. 
diciary." SeeS. 1392, 75th Cong. (1937). 
153. See Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 159 (1960). 
154. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
155. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 58-59 (9th ed. 1975). 
156. See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Ju-
risdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 
895-96 (1984). 
157. See generally Constitutional Restraints upon the Judiciary: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary United 
States Senate, 97th Cong. {1981) (involving oversight hearings to define the scope 
of the Senate's authority under Article III of the Constitution to regulate the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts). 
158. See PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 161-62 {2d ed. 1989). 
159. See Nick Budnick, Judge: Prop. 198 Is Constitutional, RECORDER, Nov. 
18, 1997, at 1 (stating that Secretary of State Bill Jones requested a decision by 
mid-November in order to have time to make a changeover to an open primary 
system and noting there was little chance of overturning the ruling in time to af-
fect the upcoming primaries). 
160. See H .R.J. Res. 77, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing a constitutional 
amendment providing that an Article III judge may not hold office for more than 
10 years without the consent of the Senate). 
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VII. THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY AND THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: A 
COUNTERINTUITIVE DEFENSE OF THE COURTS 
At least in the minds of some critics of federal courts, the initia-
tive process reflects the popular will while federal courts, dominated 
by the liberal elite, frequently frustrate the will of the people.161 This 
Article argues that the initiative process often fails to reflect the 
popular will because of low voter turn out, misleading ad campaigns, 
the absence of compromise measures that would receive greater sup-
port, and voter confusion about complex matters beyond the under-
standing of many voters. 162 This section examines the other part of 
the attack on federal courts, that they do not reflect the will of the 
people. 
The traditional liberal defense of federal courts is that they are 
designed to protect minority rights. 163 If that frustrates the majority 
and the majority cannot amend the Constitution, so be it. There is 
much to be said for a judicial system that can dispense justice, be-
cause judges do not fear the wrath of the public or at least because 
they do not fear for their job security!64 While defending rights of 
unpopular groups before the courts is an essential element of justice, 
federal courts are not nearly as far out of synch with the popular will 
as their critics claim. 
This section first addresses some general reasons why federal 
courts do not stray far from majoritarian sentiment. It then addresses 
some of the specific claims made by proponents of Proposition 209 
and concludes that careful examination of the Supreme Court's af-
firmative action jurisprudence was closer to popular preference than 
portrayed by critics of affirmative action. 
Article III obviously creates the opportunity for judges to exert 
independent judgment. The Constitution includes numerous checks 
on judges; practical limitations on judicial power create additional 
checks on that power. 
161. See supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra Parts III, IV. 
163. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 128, at 1110-15. 
164. For example, even otherwise conservative critics of the Court have justi-
fied the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). Also, Robert Bark has argued that, although the analysis used by the 
Court was incorrect, the case can be justified in light of an original understanding 
of the Constitution. See BORK, supra note 132, at 74-84. 
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Despite the contention of some extremists/ 65 federal judges rep~ 
resent a broad spectrum of political views. For example, the Su-
preme Court includes judges appointed by five different presidents.166 
While some of those judges have honored principles of stare decisis 
and have not affected a wholesale overruling of earlier precedent, 167 
they have obviously affected a change in the Court's jurisprudence.168 
For some who want complete political victory, change may not come 
quickly enough. The political spectrum reflected on the Court un-
dercuts the view of a Court hopelessly out of touch with majority 
sentiment. 
As the nation learned during the Senate hearings on the nomi-
nation of Robert Bork, the Senate's advice and consent powee69 
works an important constraint on a president's ability to appoint an 
extremist. Judge Bork was just that. 170 
Despite disingenuous claims by some members of Congress-
either because President Clinton is a political moderate or because he 
learned from the bitter Bork confirmation battle-Clinton has ap-
pointed a string of political moderates to the federal court.171 At least 
as long as we have an executive from a different party than the major-
ity of the Senate, the opportunity to appoint political extremists is 
virtually non-existent. 
165. See BORK, supra note 132, at 101 (suggesting that the Rehnquist Court is 
"more liberal than the American people"). 
166. Chief Justice Rehnquist was appointed by President Nixon as a Justice of 
the Court and by President Reagan as Chief Justice; Justice Stevens, by President 
Ford; Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, by President Reagan; Justices 
Souter and Thomas, by President Bush; and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, by 
President Clinton. 
167. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992) 
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-1001 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
168. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-30 (1991) (overruling 
four-year old and two-year old precedent). 
169. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
170. That is demonstrated by even a casual reading of ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 132. There is considerable irony in recent 
claims by Senator Orrin Hatch, justifying his Senate Judiciary Committee's slow 
action on judicial nominees, that President Clinton is attempting to appoint activ-
ists to the bench. For example, one commentator observed that President Clin-
ton has succeeded in fulfilling his 1992 campaign promise to "name intelligent 
judges who possess balanced judicial temperament and evince a commitment to 
protecting the individual rights enumerated in the Constitution." Carl Tobias, 
Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 23 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 741, 741 (1997). 
171. See Tobias, supra note 170, at 742-47. 
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As Justice Frankfurter often warned, federal courts have limited 
enforcement capacity. m Issuing unpopular decrees that go unen-
forced undercuts the credibility of the Court. As demonstrated by 
President Eisenhower's hesitation to enforce the federal district 
court's order to desegregate Little Rock's Central High School,173 the 
federal courts may be rendered powerless without support of the ex-
ecutive branch of government. 
The initiative often fails to reflect the majority because of mis-
leading campaigns and the uncompromising nature of the initiative 
process.174 By contrast, the judicial process is deliberative. Even if 
counsel on one side is more capable than opposing counsel, judges' 
questions, additional research by their clerks, discussion among 
judges, and discussion between judges and their clerks all contribute 
to careful consideration of a given legal issue. The deliberative proc-
ess may result in a position that reflects a realistic compromise of 
views. Over time, the Court may modify its position on a given social 
issue and take into account problems created by the original deci-
sion.175 Even with its blemishes, judicial decision-making is rational, 
deliberative, and flexible . 
The judicial process is not intended to produce majoritarian re-
sults. But the system is not without checks on the judiciary. What 
then of Proposition 209, often cited as a clear example of majoritar-
ian sentiment?176 Captioned the "California Civil Rights Initiative," it 
provides that "[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant pref-
erential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, 
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public em-
ployment, public education, or public contracting. " 177 
172 See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498-500 (1941) 
(seeking to avoid an equal protection claim, in part, because of sensitive issue of 
federal regulation of states). 
173. See DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE FIFTIES 685-87 (1993). 
174. See supra notes 53-63, 69-83 and accompanying text. 
175. Although the Supreme Court's death penalty decisions have been subject 
to considerable criticism, those decisions reflect the kind of give-and-take that 
occurs over time as more subtle questions arise. See Michael Vitiello, Payne v. 
Tennessee: A "Stunning Ipse Dixit," 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 
165, 231-36 (1994) (discussing underlying themes that have emerged in the 
Court's death penalty case law). 
176. Proposition 209 was approved by 54% of Californians who voted in the 
November 5, 1996 election, arguably reflecting the majority sentiment. See Gale 
Holland, Calif Vote Pushes Affirmative Action onto National Agenda, U.S.A. 
TODAY, Nov. 7, 1996, at A4. 
177. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3l(a). 
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One might dwell on the obvious efforts to make the language 
ambiguous. While parading under the banner of "Civil Rights," its 
proponents were counting on the white male vote as primary support 
for its passage.178 An appeal to the angry white male is not generally 
considered the stuff of civil rights. In addition the drafters also at-
tempted to appear politically neutral by denouncing "discrimination 
against" enumerated groups.179 However, the proposition adds noth-
ing to legal protection for minority groups that the Equal Protection 
Clause does not already provide.180 The proposition is a one-way 
street, despite the cosmetic appeal to neutrality; it only takes away 
protection from the enumerated groups.181 
Apart from the language of the initiative that may have misled, 
the campaign rhetoric also misled. For example, Governor Pete Wil-
son was typical of many supporters of the measure when he stated 
that "[a] generation ago, we did it right. We passed civil rights laws 
to prohibit discrimination. But special interests hijacked the civil 
rights movement. Instead of equality, the government imposed quo-
tas, preferences, and set-asides." 182 Proposition 209 proponents over-
stated the preferences allowed by the Court. 
To contend, as did many proponents of Proposition 209/83 that 
quotas were lawful under Supreme Court precedent, is simply 
wrongheaded or intentionally misleading. The proponents of Propo-
sition 209 acted as if almost a decade of Supreme Court case law did 
not exist. 
178. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1495 n.12 
(N.D. Cal. 1996). "White voters were the only racial or ethnic group supporting 
[Proposition] 209," and the approvaVdisapproval breakdown of the voters was 
listed as follows: male 61 %/39%; female 48%/52%; white 63%/37%; black 
26%174%; Latino 24%176%; Asian 39%/61%. See id. 
179. See Proposition 215, in 1996 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 
13, at 32. 
180. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 (providing that no persons shall be de-
nied equal protection of the law); CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 7(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
2000(d), (e) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in any project or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance on the basis of race and in employment on the basis 
of sex). 
181. See generally Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1495-98 (finding 
that the effect of Proposition 209 is to substantially reduce opportunities avail-
able for minorities and women in the areas of contracting, employment, and edu-
cation maintained by California public entities). 
182 See Proposition 215, in 1996 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 
13, at 32. 
183. See id. at 32-33 (stating arguments for and against implementation of 
Proposition 209, with no mention by the proponents that the proposition was 
designed to end affirmative action programs in California). 
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Beginning at the end of the 1980s with the appointment of Jus-
tice Kennedy, the Court's affirmative action case law started to shift 
significantly.184 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co./85 Richmond, 
Virginia, had in place an affirmative action program that guaranteed 
that thirty percent of the city's construction funds went to black-
owned firms. Previous case law had required a federal court to exam-
ine with strict scrutiny legislation imposing a burden on minorities; 
unless that legislation served a compelling governmental interest and 
was narrowly tailored to serve that interest, it would be found to vio-
late equal protection.186 The standard was strict. As one Justice ob-
served, it may have been "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."187 
In Croson, the Court imposed the same level of scrutiny to local 
legislation-presumably favored by a majority of that governmental 
entity-favoring a group historically discriminated against.188 Absent 
proof of prior discrimination on the part of the entity that now sought 
to favor the minority group, affirmative action efforts almost cer-
tainly violate equal protection.189 Good motives, according to Justice 
O'Connor, often the swing vote in equal protection cases, do not jus-
tify discrimination.190 Similarly, Justice Kennedy has insisted that 
"[t]he moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the 
Equal Protection Clause. "191 
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 192 the Supreme Court ex-
tended Croson to a case involving the federal government's "practice 
of giving general contractors on Government projects a financial 
184. That the Court would have cut back on affirmative action is not surprising 
in light of the fact that President Reagan ran on a platform to eliminate affirma-
tive action. See Joan Biskupic, The Supreme Court's Change of Heart, WASH. 
POST NAT'L WKLY., Dec. 22-29, 1997, at 29. 
185. 488 u.s. 469 (1989). 
186. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986). 
187. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J ., concurring). 
"(T]he failure of legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has led some to won-
der whether our review of racial classifications has been strict in theory, but fatal 
in fact. " See id. (citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Fore-
word: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)). 
188. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-95. 
189. See id. at 496-97. 
190. See Biskupic, supra note 184, at 29. 
191. Croson, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
192. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
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incentive to hire subcontractors controlled by 'socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individuals."'193 Five Justices agreed that Cro-
son's strict scrutiny test applied to racial classifications imposed by 
the federal government, as well as to those imposed by local and state 
governments.194 
The Fifth Circuit has read the recent Supreme Court cases to 
disallow consideration of race in law school admissions.195 A divided 
Court in Regents of University of California v. Bakke196 suggested 
that, while quotas or rigid set-aside admissions programs violated 
federal law, a university could take race into consideration.197 A 
number of justices have recognized that the state may have a legiti-
mate interest in a diverse student body. 198 The Fifth Circuit found 
that the Supreme Court would in effect overrule that aspect of 
Bakke.199 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Thurgood Marshall 
Legal Society v. Hopwood,1lXl thereby avoiding an opportunity to ad-
dress the issue. 
Proposition 209 was aimed, in part, at limiting California's vol-
untary race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs in 
contracting, employment, and education.201 As discussed, at least in-
sofar as race-based classifications were based on general societal dis-
crimination, those programs may have been vulnerable to an equal 
protection attack under the Supreme Court's recent case law.202 
193. /d. at 204. 
194. See id. at 222. While only part of Justice O'Connor's opinion secured five 
votes, Justice Scalia would have applied an even stricter strict scrutiny standard. 
See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
195. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub 
nom. Thurgood Marshall Legal Society v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996). 
196. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
197. See id. at 318 (plurality opinion). 
198. See id. at 311-12 (Powell, J., separate opinion). Numerous Justices have 
recognized that diversity may provide a sufficient constitutional purpose for race 
conscious admission decisions. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J. , dissent-
ing, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.), 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 288 
(O'Connor, J ., concurring). 
199. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-46. 
200. 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996). 
201. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1495-98. 
202 See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text. While the Supreme 
Court has examined gender classification under intermediate scrutiny, as op-
posed to strict scrutiny, as of yet the Court has not resolved whether an entity 
may base gender classifications on a need to remedy general societal discrimina-
tion, as opposed to a need to remedy past discrimination by the specific entity 
that seeks to rely on the gender classification. Compare Engineering Contractors 
Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997), with Michigan 
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The area most directly affected by Proposition 209 is education. 
While the California Board of Regents forced the University of Cali-
fornia system to implement race neutral admissions policies prior to 
passage of Proposition 209,203 the initiative narrowed the considera-
tion of race and gender allowed by Supreme Court precedent.204 
The voters almost certainly misunderstood the state of the law 
when they voted for Proposition 209. Given the widely held percep-
tion that federal courts have created unfair opportunities for women 
and minorities, voters may have voted for Proposition 209 to express 
disapproval of federal courts. They also may have disfavored af-
firmative action in hiring, but not in education. As discussed, part of 
the problem with the initiative process is that it does not allow subtle 
d . . k' 205 ec1S1on-ma mg. 
That California voters may have wanted to end some affirmative 
action programs but not others, finds support in at least one recent 
public opinion poll. A recent New York Times/CBS News Poll sug-
gests that a majority of those polled oppose race- and gender-based 
preferences.206 Depending on how the question was framed, signifi-
cant majorities agreed that diversity in a university's student body is 
important and that "they favor 'special efforts' to help racial minori-
ties compete."207 
Polling results depend ·on subtle semantic changes. So too do 
election results. Houston voters defeated a measure similar to 
Proposition 209, but one which used less inflammatory language. 
Houston's mayor was able to shape the language to avoid framing the 
issue in terms of ending preferential treatment.208 
Rd. Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987). 
203. Prior to Proposition 209, the University of California campuses selected 
40%-60% of students based on their grades, test scores, and course work. The 
remaining selections were based on a combination of certain criteria including 
the following: residence, physical and learning disability, educational disadvan-
tage, family income, ethnicity, public service, and special athletic, artistic, or mu-
sical ability. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1497. 
204. See supra notes 184-202 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83. 
206. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Most Oppose Race-Based Hiring Criteria, Poll 
Finds, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 14, 1997, at A8. 
207. /d. 
208. See Peter Callaghan, Ballot Issues Often Become Game of Twister with the 
Words, MORNING NEWS TRIB., Jan. 25, 1998, at B5. The Houston initiative 
asked voters if they wished to end "affirmative action," as compared to Califor-
nia's Proposition 209, that asked voters if they wished to end '"preferential 
treatment' by canceling programs that 'discriminate."' /d. This choice of words 
by initiative proponents was most likely the difference between passage by Cali-
fornia voters and the initiative's failure in Houston. 
1302 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1275 
A closer examination of Proposition 209 and the state of the law 
prior to the election suggests two things. First, one ought to be cau-
tious about making definitive statements about the will of the people 
on the question of race-based programs. Second, the general notion 
that the federal courts were far out of line with majoritarian senti-
ment is overstated. California voters appeared to believe that 
Proposition 209 was about quotas and rigid set-aside programs and 
that those remedies were permissible under Supreme Court prece-
dent.209 
Commentators who regret passage of Proposition 209 may be 
willing to concede that it represents majority sentiment, but believe 
that a constitutional government should protect minority interests.210 
That position has strong moral appeal in light of historical discrimi-
nation against many of the minority groups now deprived some pro-
tection by the initiative. The proposition is also subject to criticism 
for its willingness to withdraw protection from groups historically 
discriminated against while allowing preferential treatment in favor 
of other groups, like veterans who have received the benefit of af-
firmative action in various settings. 211 
We are not as willing to concede the premise that Proposition 
209 reflects majoritarian sentiment. This Article does not present 
empirical support but offers a working hypothesis that ought to be 
the subject of further research. First, even though the proposition re-
ceived a clear majority of the electorate, many Californians did not 
vote in the election.212 Those least likely to vote are members of mi-
nority groups who would almost certainly have opposed the meas-
ure.213 Second, as discussed, the campaign in favor of the proposition 
was misleading. It portrayed the proposition as necessary to overturn 
209. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. 
210. See Peter Schrag, Conflict Between the Courts and "the Will of the Peo-
ple," SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 6, 1997, at B7 (arguing that the courts are some-
times needed to overturn "the often impulsive and unexamined acts of the elec-
torate" when they enact legislation that "effectively trump[s] the First 
Amendment, the rights of minorities and other constitutional protections"). 
211. See Interview with Brian K. Landsberg, Professor of Law at McGeorge 
School of Law, in Sacramento, Cal. (Jan. 22, 1998) (on file with McGeorge 
School of Law). 
212 See What Others Say, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 19, 1997, at F4 (noting that 
California voter turnout was less than 60% of those registered to vote, and that 
of those who took the time to vote, many avoided the numerous propositions on 
the ballot). 
213. See generally MAGLEBY, supra note 12, at 100-22 (discussing "[t]he Rep-
resentativeness of Voters who Decide Statewide Propositions," and finding un-
derrepresentation in groups of lower socioeconomic status). 
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quotas and set-aside programs that ought to have been found im-
proper under existing laW.214 
Third, it lumped together programs involving contracting, em-
ployment, and education.215 If public opinion polls are an accurate 
reflection of public sentiment, many Californians may have favored 
discretion to allow university administrators to guarantee diversity in 
a student body but voted in favor of the measure because they disap-
proved of affirmative action in hiring decisions. Even if a majority 
favored the proposition on balance, a broader majority may have fa-
vored a more subtle provision, one that would have granted univer-
sity admissions offices leeway to assure minority representation on 
• • 216 
umverstty campuses. 
Fourth, at least early projections suggest that the primary effect 
of Proposition 209 will be a reallocation of admissions from Hispanic 
and African American to Asian students, with a slight negative effect 
on white admissions in the university system.217 It may be cynical to 
speculate that some white voters, convinced that they were unfairly 
excluded from state-run programs, would have been less willing to 
back such an obvious divisive measure for no net gain in white ad-
missions to the university system. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
After the passage of Proposition 209, its proponents were angry 
with the federal district court which slowed its implementation. In 
response, they joined the movement of those who would limit the 
authority of the independent federal judiciary.218 That is a bad choice. 
This Article has argued that the initiative process has long since 
ceased being the panacea envisioned by its Progressive and Populist 
214. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text. 
215. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
216. See Verhovek, supra note 206, at A8. 
217. See David Weinshilboum, New Admissions Policies Will Cut Diversity at 
UCD, DAVIS ENTERPRISE, Nov. 2, 1997, at Al. The racial composition of the 
1994 fall freshman class was as follows: American Indian representation at .96%; 
African American representation at 4.35%; Latino representation at 14.87%; 
Filipino representation at 4.26%; Asian representation at 32.28%; and Cauca-
sian/other representation at 43.28%. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. 
at 1497. If the enactment of Proposition 209 forced discontinuing existing race-
and gender-conscious selection criteria, African American and American Indian 
representation is projected to reduce by as much as 40-50%, with Filipino and 
Asian American representation increasing by 5% and 15-25%, respectively. See 
id. 
218. See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text. 
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parents. It has argued that money controls the process and skews the 
law in numerous ways. California often ends up with confusion both 
in understanding the language of the law and in measuring the will of 
the people.219 
This Article also has argued that the judicial process, involving 
the deliberation of independent judges, produces better results than 
does the process of direct democracy.220 This Article has rejected the 
widely voiced criticism that the federal judiciary is dominated by 
elitist judges out of touch with majoritarian sentiment. Instead, it ar-
gues that structural and practical pressures bring judicial decisions 
closer to majoritarian will than the courts ' critics acknowledge.221 
Sadly, those courts remain the convenient targets of the disgruntled. 
219. See discussion supra Parts III, V. 
220. See discussion supra Part VIII. 
221. See discussion supra Part VII. 
